ESBMC is a mature, permissively licensed open-source contextbounded model checker for the verification of single-and multithreaded C programs. It can verify both predefined safety properties (e.g., bounds check, pointer safety, overflow) and user-defined program assertions automatically. ESBMC provides C++ and Python APIs to access internal data structures, allowing inspection and extension at any stage of the verification process. We discuss improvements over previous versions of ESBMC, including the description of new front-and back-ends, IEEE floating-point support, and an improved k-induction algorithm. A demonstration is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YcJjXHlN1v8.
INTRODUCTION
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ESBMC primarily aims to help software developers by finding subtle bugs in their code (e.g., array bounds violations, NULLpointer dereferences, arithmetic overflows, or deadlocks). It does not require any special annotations in the source code to find such bugs, but it does allow users to add their own assertions and also checks for violations of these. In addition, ESBMC implements kinduction [3] and can be used to prove the absence of property violations (resp. the validity of user-defined assertions). It relies on off-the-shelf satisfiability modulo theory (SMT) solvers such as Boolector, Z3, Yices, MathSAT, and CVC4 to check automatically the verification conditions corresponding to the safety properties.
ESBMC has been applied to a large number of applications including telecommunications, control systems, and medical devices [4] . It is open source (under the terms of the Apache License 2.0) and its source code and self-contained binaries for 64-bit Linux environments are available at https://github.com/esbmc/esbmc/ and www.esbmc.org, respectively.
COMPONENTS AND FEATURES
By default, ESBMC takes a C program and checks for array bounds violations, divisions by zero, pointer safety (incl. alignment), and all user-defined properties. It has options to check for overflows, memory leaks, deadlocks and data-races, and to choose between a fixedor (IEEE) floating-point arithmetic. Figure 1 shows its architecture.
Front-end. ESBMC now uses clang [2] , a state-of-the-art compiler suite for C/C++/ObjectiveC/ObjectiveC++ widely used in industry [5] , as its front-end. As developers, we thus avoid the need to maintain a separate front-end, but this approach also brings a number of advantages for users: (i) ESBMC provides compilation error messages as expected from an industrial-strength tool; (ii) ESBMC leverages clang's powerful static analyzer to provide meaningful warnings when parsing the program; (iii) clang can simplify the input program (e.g., calculate sizeof expressions, evaluate static asserts), which simplifies the analysis of the code. Note that we use clang's API to access and traverse the program AST, without having details of the input program compiled away, which differs from other verifiers (e.g., LLBMC [6] ) that rely on the LLVM bytecode.
Control-flow Graph (CFG) Generator. The CFG generator takes the program AST and transforms it into an equivalent GOTO program: a simplified representation that consists only of assignments, conditional and unconditional branches, assumes, and assertions. In particular, this step eliminates all for, while, do-while and switch statements. It also adds checks for division by zero Symbolic Execution Engine. ESBMC then symbolically executes the GOTO program: it unrolls loops k times, generates the static single assignments (SSA) form of the unrolled program, and derives all the safety properties to be checked by the SMT solver. This step also inserts pointer safety checks for dynamically allocated memory, if they are enabled. Note that this can only be done after unrolling because the pointer analysis needs to know the maximum set of dynamically allocated structures. ESBMC aggressively simplifies the program to generate small SSA sets, using constant folding and various arithmetic (including floating-point) simplifications.
SMT back-end. ESBMC's SMT back-end supports five solvers: Boolector (default), Z3, MathSAT, CVC4 and Yices. The back-end is highly configurable and allows the encoding of quantifier-free formulas with support for bitvectors, arrays, tuple, fixed-point and floating-point arithmetic (all solvers), and linear integer and real arithmetic (all solvers but Boolector). We use the back-end to encode the SSA form of the program into a quantifier-free formula and check satisfiability of C ∧ ¬P, where C is the set of constraints and P is the set of properties. If the formula is SAT, the program contains a bug: ESBMC will generate a counterexample with the set of assignments that lead to the property violation.
Python API. ESBMC now includes a Python API that reduces the difficulty of prototyping new features and makes the tool internals accessible to a wider audience, i.e., the verification process shown in Figure 1 can be intercepted and changed at any point. For example, a developer can easily add their own intrinsic function to model a new library function or to exploit a different SMT theory: The code overrides the default instruction interpretation function (l1), and for function-call instructions (l3) aquires the call definition (l4), the name of the called function (l5), and should it be named 'isnan' (l6) applies special handling (l7, details omitted). For all other instructions the default instruction interpretation function is called (l10).
Python is well-known for its expressiveness (e.g., set comprehensions) and the language bindings eliminate the need to consider object lifetime and other low-level details. Rapid prototyping is encouraged by avoiding recompilation of the main tool; it enables new verification ideas to be quickly tested. However, the Python API also has drawbacks-it is slower than C++, and developers can operate it illegally, causing the tool to crash. In the long term, it would thus be desirable to provide ESBMC as a library of verification facilities for the development of new tools.
THE K-INDUCTION PROOF RULE
k-induction allows BMC to find a property violation or even to prove (partial) correctness without fully unwinding loops. ESBMC uses the algorithm in an iterative deepening style:
Here, the base case formula B(k ) is the standard BMC formula, which is satisfiable iff the program has a counterexample of length k or less. If all states are reachable for the current k, we know that the program must be correct without checking the inductive step. The forward condition F (k ) formalizes this; it can be derived from the program by inserting unwinding assertions after each loop. This step is particularly useful for proving safety in the presence of bounded loops. The inductive step I (k ) checks that, if a safety property holds in the first k steps, then it also holds for k + 1 steps. Iterative deepening implies that ESBMC always finds the smallest k to either prove correctness or find a property violation. ESBMC now uses scheme improved over the earlier version described by Gadelha et al. [3] . In particular, this new version no longer collects havocked variables into states, rewriting every access to these variables into state accesses. Instead, the havocked variables are directly assigned nondeterministic values in the inductive step. This is a simpler and more accurate transformation and follows the work by Donaldson et al. [7] . Note, however, that their implementation works by unwinding the program during CFG generation, thus replicating the loop k times and removing the backward jump. In ESBMC, the algorithm only adds the nondeterministic assignments before the loop and the required assumptions [3] during CFG generation, and relies on the symbolic execution to unroll the loop.
FLOATING-POINT ENCODING IN ESBMC
In previous versions, ESBMC verified programs using a fixed-point arithmetic [4] ; this is appropriate for, e.g., programs running in a number of embedded devices, but not for programs that rely on floating-point arithmetic. The current version of ESBMC encodes floating-point arithmetic either using the SMT theory of floatingpoints, fully available in Z3 and, partially, in Mathsat and CVC4, or using bitvectors, which extends the floating-point arithmetic support (except for floating-point exceptions) to all solvers that are currently integrated. This is a major improvement over our prior work [8] , where we model most of the C11 standard functions [9] .
Currently, MathSAT does not support fp.rem (remainder operator) and fp.fma (fused multiply-add) and CVC4 does not support sort conversion functions. Our SMT backend falls back to the bitvector mode when an unsupported operation needs to be encoded; it converts the arguments from floating-points to bitvectors, encodes the operation and returns the resulting bitvector encoded as a floating-point. This is only possible by using the (non-standard) SMT-LIB functions fp_as_ieeebv and fp_from_ieeebv to convert to and from bitvectors. This process is transparent to the user and effectively means that missing operations will be correctly encoded, despite the lack of support by the underlying solver; it allows us to use SMT solvers as Boolector and Yices that do not have any built-in floating-point theory. Most of the floating-point operations in ANSI-C programs can be directly converted to SMT; only two operations needed special handling:
Cast to Boolean. The SMT standard does not define conversions between Boolean and floating-point types. In ESBMC, when casting from Booleans to floating-points, an ite operator is used, such that the result of the cast is 1.0 if the Boolean is true; otherwise it is 0.0. We encode casts from floating-points to Booleans as conditional assignments: the cast result is true when the floating is not 0.0; otherwise it is false.
Equality. Bitvector assignment and equality operations are encoded using the equality operator (==). However, the SMT standard defines a separate operator for floating-point equalities, the fp.eq operator, where "(fp.eq x y) evaluates to true if x evaluates to -zero and y to +zero, or vice versa. fp.eq and all the other comparison operators evaluate to false if one of their arguments is NaN". The operator is defined to handle the special symbols from the IEEE floating-point standard, in particular, signaled zeros and NaNs; for this reason, ESBMC encodes all equality of floating-points using the fp.eq operator, while assignments remain encoded using the equality operator.
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
We describe how to verify a C program with ESBMC using the code fragment shown in Fig. 2. Here, ESBMC is invoked as follows:
where <file>.c is the C program to be checked, --floatbv indicates that ESBMC will use floating-point arithmetic to represent the program's float and double variables, and --k-induction selects the k-induction proof rule. The user can select the SMT solver, property, and verification strategy; esbmc --help provides the full list of options.
ESBMC unrolls the program in Fig. 2 and converts it into SSA form, to produce verification conditions (VCs), one for each assertion that can not be statically determined. Equations (1) and (2) give C and P during the inductive step (k = 2). Note that isnan(x 1 ) in Eq. (1) checks if the symbol is a NaN , which is translated to the fp.isNaN SMT operator. ESBMC also adds additional literals for each clause of P to identify the respective VCs. The resulting formula C ∧ ¬P is then passed to an SMT solver, where it is checked in less than one second. We can also introduce a bug by removing the isnan(x ) check from line 5 in Fig. 2 ,
(effectively removing д 2 from Eq. (1)) which would lead to the counterexample in the right-hand side. Here, state S 3 leads to an assertion failure in line 13 (i.e., if x = −NaN , then x > 0.0f evaluates to false); ESBMC is also able to detect this violation in less than one second. Fig. 2 also shows the transformations introduced by the inductive step, during k-induction; the transformations are commented out during the base case and the forward condition. The transformations aim to prove that no property violation is reachable, regardless of loop unwinding; this is translated to assuming nondeterministic values to the loop variables (lines [8] [9] , assuming that the loop body is evaluated (line 10, the assumption removes every state that does not satisfy the loop entry condition) and terminates (line 16, the assumption removes every state that does not satisfy the loop termination condition). Note that, since the inductive step is an overapproximation, only correctness can be proved, i.e., it might find spurious counterexamples. Correct true  1898 1438  3790  1184  1957  2822  1418  3902  1725  2292  Correct false  1426 1856  2598  1516  1476  1494  1209  1278  514  563  Incorrect true  2  2  0  19  336  14  1  2  0  3  Incorrect false  5  3  4  37  92  10  0  0  0  3   Total correct results 3324 3294  6388  2694  3433  4316  2627  5180  2239  2855  Total incorrect results 7  5  4  58  428  24  1 2 0 6
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We evaluated ESBMC over the SV-COMP [10] benchmarks, which comprises 9523 verification tasks that check for property reachability (2941 tasks), memory safety (326 tasks), reachability in concurrent programs (1047 tasks), overflow (358 tasks), termination (2009 tasks) and reachability in Linux device drivers (2842 tasks). Table 1 shows our experimental results; a detailed description of the different tools and the experimental setup can be found in [10] . Here, a task counts as correct true if it does not contain any reachable error location or assertion violation, and the tool reports "safe"; however, if the tool reports "unsafe", it counts as incorrect true. Similarly, a task counts as correct false if it does contain a reachable violation, and the tool reports "unsafe", together with a confirmed witness (path to failure); otherwise, it counts as incorrect false accordingly. The difference between the grand total (9523) and the sum of the two sub-totals gives the number of tasks for which the tool exhausted time or memory, or failed otherwise. k-induction. Overall, ESBMC ranked third, behind CPA-Seq and UAutomizer, with 14 incorrect false results (10 due to inaccuracies in our concurrency and memory models, plus 4 due to bugs in the simplifier), and 10 incorrect true results. However, none of the incorrect results are related to the k-induction algorithm, and the results show that ESBMC is currently the best k-induction tool. ESBMC outperformed CPA-Seq and UAutomizer in the verification of reachability properties for arrays and memory safety issues.
CBMC also implements k-induction, requiring three different calls: to generate the CFG, to annotate the program and to verify it, whereas ESBMC handles the whole process in a single call. Additionally, CBMC does not have a forward condition to check if all states were reached and relies on a limited loop unwinding [7] .
CPA-Seq applies a number of different techniques when verifying a program, so a direct comparison to their k-induction is not possible; however, a "pure k-induction" version (CPA-kind [11] ) showed poor results in a previous competition.
DepthK uses an invariant generator to instrument the code with invariants and uses k-induction to verify the program [12] . Although one would expect better results, DepthK uses an old version of ESBMC to verify the programs; this explains the poor results.
2LS integrates an abstract interpretation invariant generation between the base case and the inductive step; in contrast to our k-induction, their version has no forward condition. Overall 2LS verifies 22% fewer benchmarks than ESBMC (2LS returns 33% fewer correct results), although it also returns fewer incorrect results.
Comparison with old k-induction schema. In order to compare with the old k-induction schema used in ESBMC v1.25.2 [3] , we re-ran it over the current SV-COMP benchmark set. Table 1 shows a 25% increase in correct results and a 95% decrease in incorrect results, but this is slightly misleading: 168 of the incorrect results produced by the old scheme are from the concurrency category and are caused by the concurrent model used back then. However, the old scheme also produces incorrect results in the ReachSafety-ECA (95) and ReachSafety-Recursive (28) categories, which are related to its incorrect approximation of loop termination conditions.
Floating-point verification. ESBMC uses MathSAT for tasks that involve floating-point arithmetics. This combination not only outperforms a Z3-based ESBMC, but also all other tools in SV-COMP. ESBMC achieved the highest score in the ReachSafety-Floats subcategory where it can verify 84% of the tasks (145 out of 172) within the time and memory restrictions.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We presented ESBMC, the first open-source SMT-based contextbounded model checker to support full C programs [4, 13] . ESBMC is a mature tool; here, we focussed on three novel features of ES-BMC v5.0: the new clang front-end, the new floating-point back-end and, in particular, our new implementation of the k-induction proof rule. Results over the SV-COMP 2018 benchmark suite show that ESBMC is the strongest k-induction tool currently available. We are extending the k-induction proof rule to use information from the inductive step, to make bug finding more efficiently [14] .
